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Abstract We present a novel market-based method, inspired by retail markets, for resource
allocation in fully decentralised systems where agents are self-interested. Our market mech-
anism requires no coordinating node or complex negotiation. The stability of outcome allo-
cations, those at equilibrium, is analysed and compared for three buyer behaviour models.
In order to capture the interaction between self-interested agents, we propose the use of
competitive coevolution. Our approach is both highly scalable and may be tuned to achieve
specified outcome resource allocations. We demonstrate the behaviour of our approach in
simulation, where evolutionary market agents act on behalf of service providing nodes to
adaptively price their resources over time, in response to market conditions. We show that
this leads the system to the predicted outcome resource allocation. Furthermore, the system
remains stable in the presence of small changes in price, when buyers’ decision functions
degrade gracefully.
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1 Introduction
Emerging paradigms for the development and deployment of massively distributed com-
putational systems allow resources to span many locations, organisations and platforms,
connected through the Internet [50]. In such systems, both service providing and service us-
ing nodes may arrive, organise and dissipate, as computational capabilities are formed and
reformed as needed, without reference to a central authority or coordinator.
As the Internet matures, it is predicted that the majority of the interactions it carries will
be carried out by autonomous agents on behalf of their owners [29]. In such distributed sys-
tems, which we consider in the broadest sense, where there exists a distribution of work or
resource about a network of nodes, neither control nor even full knowledge of key resources
may be assumed. There is therefore a need to find novel ways to understand and autonom-
ically manage and control these large, decentralised and dynamic systems [40]. As part of
this, there remains the problem of how to allocate such resource amongst the nodes [35].
From an engineering perspective, any resource allocation problem will have an objec-
tive: a desired allocation or outcome. A common example of this is a balanced load, where
that the task of providing a resource is shared evenly between a group of nodes. More com-
plex objectives may involve stable, uneven allocations, where account is taken of other fac-
tors. Such factors might include users’ preferences over quality of service issues, underlying
costs to the service provider, or differences in the ability of nodes to provide an equivalent
resource. The ability to allocate resources in a desired configuration, in a scalable and robust
manner, is essential.
In many systems, nodes are either assumed or designed to be self-interested, each wish-
ing, for example, to maximise its allocation. In these cases, the total demand for a resource
may exceed its total supply. The allocation of resources to individuals in such scarcity is the
classic problem studied by economics. In the human world, building on the simple idea of
bilateral exchange, it is often approached using the structure and rules of a market, and its
tool, price.
Externality pricing has been proposed for the provision of computational services, which
are otherwise virtually zero cost per-use. Gupta et al. [27] argue that this approach, where
service users self-select their quantity based on price, is preferable to the alternative of
provider or regulator enforced quantity limits: service rationing.
Markets can also be used in settings where it is impractical or unwanted to associate
monetary payment with the resource allocation process. Indeed, market-based control is a
broad approach to resource allocation in a wide range of real-world applications [14]. In
these scenarios, artificially created markets and pricing can enable stable, efficient, self-
organising resource allocation to be achieved. For example, Wolski et al. [56] describe how
market economies might be used to allocate resources in the computational grid. In this
model, applications treat resources as interchangeable commodities, which may be provided
by anyone. They argue that in this scenario, resource decisions must be self-interested.
However, the market mechanisms employed in these systems to date, though operating
in a distributed manner, often rely upon some form of centralised coordination or control,
such as a central auctioneer, specialist, or some set of super-nodes [16]. We believe that
this lack of full decentralisation leads inevitably to unfulfilled potential in terms of both
scalability and robustness to failure.
In this paper, our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we demonstrate the ability of a posted-
offer market to achieve a range of desired resource allocations in a decentralised compu-
tational system where nodes are self-interested, outlining a game theoretic method for out-
come allocations to be predicted in a given scenario. Secondly, we use the coevolution of
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sellers’ offers to demonstrate the achievement of the predicted outcomes in simulation. We
propose this as a potential approach to realising self-interested adaptive pricing under the
assumption of private information present in the posted-offer model.
This paper extends our previous work in a number of ways: providing a theoretical un-
derpinning for the experimental results presented in [36], and extending the work on uneven
resource allocations in [37] to many-node systems. Throughout, we consider a variety of
buyer behaviours, including mixed populations, and their effect on the outcomes. Finally,
we explore the scalability of our approach.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss a number
of existing classical and market-based approaches to resource allocation, highlighting why
we believe a new approach is required in systems with no central control or coordination. In
section 3 we formulate a problem for study, based on the above scenario. We then describe
our fully decentralised market-based approach and introduce the buyer behaviours we inves-
tigate. In section 4 we analyse the expected behaviour of the system in a variety of instances
of the problem, with each buyer type, and in section 5 we describe our evolutionary market
agents. In section 6 the behaviour is demonstrated experimentally in simulation, where we
also investigate mixed buyer populations and scalability. We conclude the paper, and discuss
future prospects and research directions in section 7.
2 Related Work
2.1 Classical Approaches to Resource Allocation
Classically, resource allocation objectives are achieved in a centralised manner, often rely-
ing on a single node responsible for, say, load balancing [5]. A balanced load, though by
no means the only interesting outcome, is often used as an example of a desired resource
allocation. Load balancing is in itself interesting, since it is useful in numerous real-world
scenarios, including telecommunications networks, road networks and electricity and water
distribution networks. In many of these domains, even in very large scale systems, centrali-
sation is the usual approach taken [5].
Resource allocation techniques can be divided into two groups, stateless and state-based
[10]. Perhaps the most widely known and easily understood stateless approach, used to
balance the load on web servers, is round-robin DNS. A more complex example is is pro-
portional share scheduling [35], in which resources are allocated to jobs according to a set
of pre-determined weights. However, stateless approaches such as this are unable to take ac-
count of current server load or availability, leading to no guarantee that the desired outcome
is achieved. Simple state-based extensions permit the usage of information about the re-
sources being managed, and enable the proximity to the desired allocation to be measured.
Examples of state-based resource allocation approaches include those which make use of
geographical information and previous usage levels in order to determine an appropriate al-
location of resource. A useful review and comparison of these approaches in the web server
domain may be found in [10].
2.2 Decentralised Approaches
Centralised resource allocation methods do however have a number of drawbacks [23].
These include:
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– the requirement that the environment remain static while the central coordinator is cal-
culating the optimal resource allocation,
– that the coordinator has global knowledge of the system and all nodes within it,
– that all coordination messages must route through the central point, both counteracting
the benefit from having resources distributed about the network, reducing scalability [1]
and creating a fundamentally brittle system [3].
This brittleness may be mitigated against to a certain degree, with backup coordinator
nodes, however even in these cases the wider system is reliant upon the existence and perfor-
mance of a small number of key nodes. Failure at these key points in the network may well
cripple wider functionality, at best [45]. These drawbacks lead to the need for a truly decen-
tralised approach to the allocation of resources that does not rely on a central coordinator
[23].
In the field of grid computing, examples include the hierarchical agent-based approach
found in [9], and TURBO [1]. In the latter, allocations are achieved through the reliance on
altruistic behaviour between cooperating peers, which collaborate in order to reach a global
objective.
Balanced overlay networks are another effective and generic technique for balancing the
load across a decentralised network [6]. In this approach, service providing nodes present
an estimation of their availability to other local nodes to which they are connected. Newly
arriving jobs take a random walk through the network and select the providing node with the
highest availability. Upon accepting and completing a job, a provider node updates its avail-
ability estimate. Here, service users are self-interested within the bounds of the providers
observed within their random walk, though the providers themselves are relied upon both
to provide an honest and accurate account of their availability and to facilitate the random
walk by exposing their local connections. In the case where such cooperation may not be
relied upon, it is likely that the system’s performance would deteriorate significantly.
In decentralised peer-to-peer storage systems where both cooperation and global knowl-
edge of the system may be assumed, Surana et al.’s [52] approach may be used. Here the
case is considered when moving loads around the network also uses bandwidth. Their ob-
jective is therefore a balance between achieving an even load and minimising the amount
of load moved. Their fully decentralised approach is, in effect, tantamount to performing
a centralised calculation at each node, periodically requiring cooperative reassignment of a
load, based on global knowledge of the system.
A non-cooperative, decentralised approach exists in the domain of downloading repli-
cated files. Dynamic parallel access schemes [48,12] make use of self-interested smart
clients to increase the speed of file downloads. It is not clear however, how this approach
might be generalised to other service-based systems.
2.3 Existing Market-Based Approaches
Making the case for economics-inspired approaches to resource allocation, Buyya et al. [7]
argue that classical approaches either rely on central coordination and complete knowledge,
or else cooperation between nodes. Khan and Ahmad [32] show that in any cooperative
approach, global optima can only be achieved when all the nodes cooperate. In a discussion
of lessons learnt from experience with load management in giant-scale web services, Brewer
[5] proposes the idea of incorporating, into a request for a resource, a notion of its value or
cost. This, along with the use of smart clients, would allow for responsive adaptation in
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the presence of changes to the network, as well as graceful degradation. Similarly, Gupta
et al. [27] argue that in the provision of virtually zero cost per-use computational services,
a mechanism involving pricing and user self-selection is preferable to the alternative of
provider or regulator enforced limits or rationing.
The application of economic ideas to resource allocation problems in computational
systems is approached in the field of market-based control, an introduction to which may be
found in [14]. Using the terminology of Casavant and Kuhl’s [11] taxonomy of scheduling
in distributed computing systems, this is a family of distributed mechanisms for dynamic
global resource allocation in a network, relying on the non-cooperative and self-interested
behaviour of nodes. Fundamentally, these approaches rely on the rational behaviour of self-
interested peers, represented by agents attempting to maximise their payoff from interactions
or exchanges within somemarket environment. The theories of microeconomics predict that,
through such repeated exchanges, efficient resource allocations may be achieved. A brief and
accessible introduction to some relevant microeconomics may be found in [17].
It is important to note that the non-cooperation of agents does not imply self-interest.
Indeed, in Khan and Ahmad’s [32] study of various games-based resource allocation meth-
ods, non-cooperative agents bid for jobs based on an honest estimation of the estimated time
to complete a job, without consideration of the benefit they expect to derive from the bid.
This is clearly not the self-interested behaviour relied upon by economics. Self-interest, at
least in a boundedly rational sense, is a key assumption of economics inspired computation,
and without it, the game theoretic approach is not useful.
Agents in a market-based system may interact through any of a number of different
mechanisms. Common examples include English, Dutch and Vickrey auctions, as well as
double auctions such as the Continuous Double Auction. Research in the field of automated
mechanism design also suggests that other less obvious auction mechanisms may lead to
more efficient outcomes [15,55].
However, both Cliff and Bruten [16] and Eymann et al. [23] note that due to the mech-
anisms employed, a large proportion of market-based control systems are not truly decen-
tralised, relying on a centralised price-fixing process rather than the participants between
them determining prices. This is true of Wolski et al.’s [56] G-Commerce model, which re-
lies upon a central market-maker. Cliff and Bruten [16] argue that the presence of such a
centralised process or component removes the primary advantage of using a market-based
system: its robust, self-organising properties.
A number of distributed auction mechanisms have also been proposed [19,28,33], which
do not rely on one central coordinating node. These approaches reduce the fragility associ-
ated with reliance upon a single point, provide more scalability and allow for dynamic com-
position of auctions. Typically, either the central auctioneer is replaced by a number of local
ones, which communicate through some secure means, or else the auctioneer role is fulfilled
by a spare, disinterested node. Double auctions, for example, though relying on a specialist
to match bids and asks [42], may be decentralised by the presence of multiple specialists
between which the participants may choose [39]. These techniques do reduce bottlenecks at
certain points within the network and the removal of a single node cannot lead to system-
wide failure. However, similarly to the replicated round-robin DNS approaches discussed in
section 2.1 above, the system is still largely reliant on a small subset of its nodes.
However, it may be possible in systems such as this to scale up the number of auctioneers
or specialists, in order to achieve a suitable degree of redundancy and decentralisation. This
issue is worth investigating further, though intuition suggests that a system which relies
upon a set of super-nodes can never provide the level of robustness of a system without such
a need, even if the super-nodes were present in abundance. Approaches such as this also
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raise questions of incentive compatibility for those acting as super-nodes. Therefore, if an
approach exists without the need for such complexity, it should be preferred.
2.4 Decentralised Market Mechanisms
Cliff and Bruten [16] conclude from their critique that, rather than depend upon a central
node such as an auctioneer, market mechanisms should instead rely on the ability of in-
telligent agents to bargain between themselves in order to arrive at acceptable prices. This
approach is taken in the AVALANCHE [21], and CATNET [22,24,23,3] systems. These
take inspiration from Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) [53] in attempting to
replicate the dynamics of human markets with complex cognitive agents. These approaches
use highly developed strategies, as agents negotiate bilaterally in order to determine the pro-
vision of a resource. Furthermore, in the approach taken in CATNET, resources are relied
upon to forward requests to neighbouring hosts, without any consideration of the effect of
this on its own interests [23]. This appears to be at odds with the self-interested nature of the
agents.
A somewhat simpler application of market principles to computational resource allo-
cation can be seen in Spawn [54]. In this approach, consuming agents bid in sealed-bid
auctions hosted by providing agents, for their resources. This again requires a high level of
strategic ability on the part of consumers, as they must decide in which auctions to partici-
pate. Of course, consumers may win multiple auctions, and questions then arise of how to
handle these situations.
Though not discussed in detail in their paper, Cliff and Bruten [16] also briefly mention
retail markets as an alternative to auctions and bilateral negotiation. The mechanism used in
modern retail markets is usually referred to as the posted-price or posted-offer model [43,
31], though in online content delivery it is sometimes referred to as the quoted-price model
[30]. It is a fully decentralised approach to the determination of price [43] without the need
for complex bilateral negotiation, and we believe that this provides a potentially simpler
alternative.
Chavez et al. [13] use an approach of this type in Challenger, where offers are broadcast
to the nodes in a network, though instead of using price, bids contain an honest reporting of a
job’s priority. Similarly to the example in [32] discussed in section 2.3 this not self-interested
behaviour. Xiao et al. [57] describe their system GridIS, in which buyers broadcast job
requests and sellers reply by posting offers to perform them at a price. However, the sellers
used require the knowledge of certain global information in determining their price, both in
the form of the latest accepted market price, which we consider to be private information,
and also the level of aggregate supply of all the providers in the network. Our assumption of
private information forbids this also.
Kuwabara et al. [34] propose an application of a posted-offer market to decentralised
computational systems, observing the quantities provided at the equilibria at which the mar-
kets arrive. No central component, such as an auctioneer or specialist is used; prices are
determined privately by the sellers and then posted via a broadcast mechanism. The buyers
then decide the quantity to purchase from each seller.
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2.5 Adaptive and Evolutionary Pricing
As in human retail markets, key to the efficiency of the posted-offer market in [34] is the
assumption of iterated transactions. For example, where a large number of buyers arrive over
a period of time, each seller is able to adapt its price such that the payoff from its transactions
is maximised. Sellers therefore compete on price, over time. From a seller’s perspective, we
are therefore faced with the questions of finding the best price, and how this price should
be adapted in response to market conditions. Of course, other sellers will also respond, as
prices co-adapt. We call this the adaptive pricing game.
Critically however, though the sellers in Kuwabara et al.’s [34] system are non-cooperative,
they are not self-interested, since they do not consider their payoff when determining their
price. Instead, a seller node’s previous usage is encoded directly as the seller’s next price.
One effective way to model self-interested competitive behaviour computationally is
with coevolution [18], an extension of evolutionary computation in which the fitness func-
tion is in part dependent upon the actions of others. Co-evolution has been used to learn
strategies in repeated games such as the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [4] and also to find
Nash Equilibria in games with continuous strategy spaces [51]. In the study of markets,
coevolution has also been used in the optimisation of parametrised bidding and bargain-
ing strategies [8,21,41,2]. Of course, in many cases, the optimisation is dynamic, as it is
performed against a moving optimum, as the competitors also update their strategies.
In [44], Price demonstrates that, rather than optimising the parameters of a particular
bidding strategy, certain classic competitive behaviour can be achieved by coevolving prices
directly. By drawing an analogy between payoff and evolutionary fitness, coevolution is
used to to drive competition in the market. In a sense, from a seller’s perspective, evolution
itself is the strategy. Amongst other examples, Bertrand competition is demonstrated by
competitively coevolving two sellers’ prices.
In the approach described in this paper, we demonstrate the ability of a posted-offer
market to achieve a range of desired resource allocations in a decentralised computational
system where nodes are self-interested. We then outline a game theoretic method for out-
come allocations to be predicted in a given scenario. We use the direct coevolution of sellers’
offers to demonstrate the achievement of the predicted outcomes in simulation, and propose
this as a potential approach to realising self-interested adaptive pricing under the assumption
of private information.
As such, this work extends preliminary experimental explorations [36] in which we
demonstrated that sellers using evolutionary market agents in a posted-offer market may
converge to an equilibrium at which the load is balanced evenly. In a two-node scenario,
we further explored evolutionary market agents in the presence of service providing nodes
with heterogeneous abilities to provide the resource. We showed in [37] that taking account
of this heterogeneity through differences in the sellers’ cost and valuations of the resource,
enables us to achieve desired uneven resource allocations.
3 Problem Formulation
3.1 Scenario and Objectives
Our objective differs from that of many market-based resource allocation mechanisms, in
that we are interested in achieving a particular outcome resource allocation in a given sce-
nario. Our approach begins from the starting point of a desired allocation of resources which
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the system designer or owner wishes to achieve. An artificial market is then created in or-
der to bring this allocation into effect, under the assumptions of decentralisation and self-
interest.
We consider a scenario consisting of a set of service providing nodes, S, each member
of which provides an equivalent, quantitatively divisible service, the resource p , which may
vary only in price. We assume that the members of S are self-interested. Nodes in S may
vary in their ability to provide p , for example, one node may be able to perform twice as
much work as another.
We then imagine a large population of service users or buyers, B, each member of which
aims to consume some of the resource p , at regular intervals. If si is a node in S and b j is a
node in B, we define qi j to be the quantity of the resource p provided by si to b j.
The total quantity of p provided by si at a given instant, its load, lsi , is therefore:
lsi =
jBj
å
j=1
qi j : (1)
Our objective is to achieve a stable, desired configuration for the provision of p by the
nodes in S. Such a configuration may be expressed by the vector LS = hls1 ; ls2 ; :::; lsni, where
n= jSj. For convenience and ease of comparison between scenarios, we often normalise this
vector by the total resource being provided.
In this way, any desired outcome allocation may be described. An evenly balanced load,
for example, may be written as h 1n ; 1n ; :::; 1n i. Similarly, an allocation between six providing
nodes, where the even numbered nodes provide exactly twice the resource as odd numbered
nodes would be h 19 ; 29 ; 19 ; 29 ; 19 ; 29 i. Though this is a trivial problem when cooperation may be
assumed, we wish to achieve this using only self-interest, in a fully decentralised manner
with no central or regional control, and with only private information available.
It is worth noting that alternative approaches exist to the measurement of load. For ex-
ample, we may wish to adopt a longer-term view, as in the long-term proportional share
approach described by Lai [35]. Here, load is averaged over a realistically set sliding time
window. Casavant and Kuhl [11] also discuss the need to determine an appropriate measure
of the load for the particular system. In this paper however, we only consider the instanta-
neous load as described above.
3.2 Mechanism and Assumptions
At a given instant, a service provider, si 2 S, advertises p at the price ppsi per unit via a broad-
cast mechanism. Each service user, a buyer in this case, then has the option of purchasing
some of the resource p , should it be in their interest to do so at the price offered. The sys-
tem iterates, with service providers able to independently adapt their prices to the market
conditions over time.
At this stage, we are not considering the effect of the embodiment of our approach in
any particular application or network environment, since this would make it unnecessarily
difficult to analyse and understand the underlying behaviour of the model. This is of course
an obvious area for future work. With this in mind, we make a number of simplifying as-
sumptions:
1. That the system proceeds synchronously in discrete time-steps,
2. that each buyer b j 2 B desires exactly one unit of p per time-step,
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3. that the actual provision of p may be regarded as instantaneous, such that it does not
interfere with the mechanism,
4. that each seller si 2 S has sufficient quantity of p available to satisfy all the buyers in B
should it be so requested, and
5. that network connectivity is uniform.
The first two assumptions are present at this abstract stage in order to aid the analysis
of the system, and we do not believe that they alter the underlying behaviour being demon-
strated. Assumptions 3 and 4 may not be appropriate for certain embodiments of the ap-
proach, however are representative in theory of the provision of information-based services
such as HTTP requests, and are present in other related work such as [34]. In our future
work we will consider scenarios where there exist hard limits on supply. Finally, assump-
tion 5 replicates the network conditions found in Wolski et al.’s G-Commerce [56].
Each time-step, each buyer, if it chooses to buy, may purchase any amount of p from any
number of service providers in S, subject to the constraint that the total amount purchased
per time-step is equal to exactly one unit. If no offer from any si 2 S is in its interest, the
buyer may instead purchase nothing. These constraints mean therefore that åjSji=1 qi j 2 f0;1g
for all b j 2 B.
3.3 Buyer Behaviour
Both buyers and sellers accrue a payoff, or utility gain, from their interactions in the mar-
ketplace. For buyers, this is the value they associate with the price paid subtracted from the
value they associate with the purchased resource. If we denote buyer b j’s unit valuation of p
by vpb j , then its payoff from a unit transaction with si will be v
p
b j
  ppsi . Since any buyer accept-
ing a price above vpb j would lead to a negative payoff, this is its reserve or limit price. From
a buyer’s perspective, if a seller’s price would not lead to a negative payoff for the buyer,
then we say that the price is acceptable. We use Sb j to denote the subset of S which contains
exactly those sellers in S whose price is acceptable to buyer b j. When buyers are homoge-
neous in so far as they have the same reserve prices, such that vpb j = v
p ;8b j 2 B, we are able
to refer to a single set of acceptable sellers, SB  S, such that SB = fsi : si 2 S; ppsi  vpg.
We assume that buyers are self-interested and loosely rational, such that they would pre-
fer higher payoffs. This is manifested through the following of some strategy, incorporating
a decision function, which describes the quantity (which may be zero) to buy from each
seller. This is a similar approach to that taken in [26], in which buyers may be either hyper-
rational bargain hunters, seeking out the best possible price, or else time savers who will
purchase from any acceptable seller, chosen at random. The possibility of complex buyer
decision functions means that there may not be a straightforward mapping between seller
abilities and valuations of the resource, and the subsequent outcome allocation.
Here, we consider the above problem in the presence of three buyer types: hyperrational
bargain hunters and time savers from [26] and the risk-averse spread buyers as described in
[36].
3.3.1 Bargain Hunters
Bargain hunters always attempt to maximise their instantaneous payoff. In each iteration,
they check the prices of all the sellers, selecting the one seller which provides the most
attractive offer (i.e. the lowest price). If this price is acceptable, then the buyer purchases its
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entire unit of p from that seller. In the event that more than one seller provides an equally
attractive and acceptable offer, the buyer purchases an even proportion of p from each such
seller.
3.3.2 Time Savers
Time savers do not check the price of every seller in the system when deciding fromwhom to
buy. Instead, they select a seller at random, and if its price is acceptable, then they purchase
the entire unit of p from that seller. If it is not, then they continue selecting previously
unchecked random sellers until they find an acceptable price. If no seller has an acceptable
price, then they purchase nothing.
3.3.3 Spread Buyers
Spread buyers are rudimentarily risk-averse, preferring to spread their purchases across a
number of sellers. At each time-step, the buyer looks at all the available offers, and purchases
a proportion of p from each seller with a price below vpb j , relative to the expected utility gain
from purchasing from that seller. Specifically, the quantity purchased by buyer j from seller
i, with an acceptable price, is determined according to the following calculation:
qi j =
(vpb j   ppsi)
(nvpb j  ånk=1 ppsk)
: (2)
3.3.4 Alternative Buyer Behaviours
It is worth noting that although we consider these three buyer strategies here, many other
behaviours could be considered. For spread buyers, for example, an alternative might be to
motivate risk-aversion through the mechanism itself. However we prefer not to complicate
the model at this stage, instead favouring the clarity gained by the assumption of risk averse
behaviour.
A behaviour with a high level of practical relevance is that of sticky buyers. Sticky buyers
prefer to continue using service providers which they have previously used. They might
switch to another seller if the long-term gain were greater than some threshold, and this
might be motivated by an explicit cost to switching. However, at this stage we leave this as
an item for future research.
3.4 Seller Behaviour
Sellers also receive a payoff, defined by their payoff function. We denote seller si’s payoff
as Psi . In its simplest form, this is its revenue from the sale of p:
Psi =
jBj
å
j=1
ppsiqi j ; (3)
or indeed
Psi = p
p
si  lsi : (4)
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However, such a payoff function takes no account of the heterogeneity of service provider
abilities, as in [37]. One service providing node, for example, may be able to perform more
work than another, due to an increased ability to provide the resource.
Such heterogeneities of service providing nodes’ abilities may be represented by their
selling agents using a notional cost of provision, along with different relative valuations of
p when compared with the notion of money [37]. Since equivalent quantities of work are
substitutable irrespective of which node performed them, we would expect that a node able
to provide more work for the same cost would place a lower valuation on performing that
quantity of work.
This valuation may be built in to our existing model in the form of a sellers’ payoff
function which takes account of the cost of the provision of p , cpsi , and a preference weight,
wsi , on the price:
Psi =
jBj
å
j=1
qi j(wsi p
p
si   cpsi) ; (5)
or
Psi = (wsi p
p
si   cpsi) lsi : (6)
Clearly, a seller wishing to maximise its revenue would aim to increase both its price
and its market share. However as we have seen from the buyers’ behaviour, the market share
will depend upon the relationship between its price and those of its competitors.
4 Predicted Outcomes
One motivation for employing an artificial market is that competition between self-interested
sellers drives the system towards equilibrium. It is at this equilibrium that the system is
stable, and thus we describe the allocation of resources in this stable state as the outcome
resource allocation. Of course, in realistic scenarios, continuing changes to the system may
lead to the existence of attractors rather than equilibria in the classic sense, though we do
not consider this case at this stage.
The model we describe here is, in essence, a generalised version of the Bertrand game
[38]. The classical Bertrand game consists of two sellers, both of whom offer to sell a cer-
tain good to a population of buyers. Each seller must decide what price to charge for the
good, and then supply the quantity subsequently demanded by the buyers. The buyers in the
classic Bertrand game behave hyperrationally, as with the bargain hunters described above,
always buying from the seller with the lowest price, or half from each seller if the prices are
identical.
In this game either seller can take the entire market by offering a price only fractionally
lower than its competitor. However, since this applies to both sellers, the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium for the game is for both sellers to charge a zero-profit price. If each seller’s
costs are equal, then the equilibrium price for each seller will also be equal. This leads to
the sellers sharing the market equally at equilibrium. As we demonstrated experimentally in
[36], it is this basic idea which provides us with a balanced load in the simplest case.
However, in the more general case, where buyers may follow any of a number of strate-
gies, calculating the expected outcome resource allocation may be a more complex task.
Here we follow the methodology of determining the sellers’ best response at each iteration,
by solving payoff equations constructed from the given buyer behaviour. This enables us to
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identify the Nash equilibrium position, where each and every seller’s best response is equal
to its previous position.
In the following discussions, we assume that the buyers do have an identical reserve
price, vp = 300, and therefore that we have a single acceptable set of sellers, SB. Any seller
in S but not in SB will of course attract no buyers at all, and will hence receive no payoff
and have a load of zero. For the sake of clarity, in the remainder of this section, we consider
only those sellers in SB.
4.1 Bargain Hunters
4.1.1 Simple Case
Let us first consider a scenario with two identical service providing nodes, such that S =
fs1;s2g, each with equivalent abilities and costs of zero. In this case the payoff given in
equation 4 will be sufficient for both sellers, so that
Ps1 = p
p
s1  ls1 : (7)
and
Ps2 = p
p
s2  ls2 : (8)
As in Bertrand competition, B is a large population of hyperrational buyers, bargain
hunters, as described above. Recalling the decision function for these buyers, and our as-
sumption that each buyer wishes to purchase exactly one unit of p , we may therefore say
that
Ps1 =
8<:
jBj pps1 if ps1 < ps2 ;
0:5jBj pps1 if ps1 = ps2 ;
0 otherwise:
(9)
and the equivalent for s2 respectively.
From a game theoretic perspective, given an observed value for their competitor’s price,
both s1 and s2 will wish to respond with the best response. In this case, this will be to
undercut the competitor’s price, if possible, in order to receive the payoff given by the first
case in equation 9. The competing seller will of course act similarly, leading to a price war
where each undercuts the other until their zero-payoff price is reached. Assuming that a
seller would rather not participate than receive a negative payoff, once ps1 = ps2 = 0, the
rational course of action is to maintain a price of 0, accepting the second case.
Recalling that the current load on a service providing node is given by equation 1 above,
we therefore have that at equilibrium,
ls1 = 0:5jBj ; (10)
and
ls2 = 0:5jBj : (11)
This is indeed an evenly balanced load, i.e.
LS = h12 ;
1
2
i: (12)
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The theory of Bertrand competition (which is described more fully in [38]) demonstrates
that when competing on price alone, two sellers are enough for the perfectly competitive
outcome described here. Since the same logic applies to larger number of sellers, this evenly
balanced outcome also holds for larger systems under the same assumptions.
4.1.2 Complex Case
Now let us consider the more complex case, where service providers may vary in their ability
to provide the resource p . As described above, this may be represented in the seller’s payoff
function, by a heterogeneity in the cost of provision, cpsi , and preference weight, wsi , as in
equation 6. Competition on price will still occur as in the more trivial case. However, the
lower limit price for each seller will depend upon its cost and preference weight. As we
might expect, that seller (or those sellers) which are able to offer the lowest price will take
the entire market, leaving those unable to compete with nothing.
We may illustrate this by means of a three-node example, such that S = fs1;s2;s3g,
where cps1 = c
p
s2 = 100, c
p
s3 = 150 and ws1 = ws2 = ws3 = 1. We therefore have the following
payoff functions:
Ps1 = (p
p
s1  100) ls1 ; (13)
Ps2 = (p
p
s2  100) ls2 ; (14)
and
Ps3 = (p
p
s3  150) ls3 : (15)
Considering first s1, clearly if its offer is to be accepted by any buyer, indicated by a
positive load, ls1 > 0, a non-negative payoff is obtained if and only if p
p
s1  100. The same
is true respectively of s2. However, for s3, this is the case if and only if ps3  150. s3 is
therefore unable to compete with s1 and s2 and will discontinue participation in the price
war once the best price dropped below 150. s1 and s2 however, will continue undercutting
each other until their prices reach 100, at which point any further price-cut would leave them
with a negative payoff themselves. However, since they both share the same limit price, they
will remain at equilibrium with ps1 = ps2 = 100, and therefore LS = h 12 ; 12 ;0i.
Now let us add a fourth node to S, s4, such that cps4 = 150 and ws4 = 2:5. s4 has the
following payoff function:
Ps4 = (2:5 pps4  150) ls4 : (16)
Now, s4’s cost is also 150, as with s3, however since its preference weight is 2:5, its
payoff will not drop below zero for positive loads so long as ps4  60. This is clearly a more
competitive position than s1 and s2 are able to take. The expected allocation at equilibrium
for this four-node system is therefore LS = h0;0;0;1i.
More generally, for purchases made by hyperrational bargain hunters, the seller or sell-
ers able to offer the lowest price will share the load evenly between them. Any unable to
offer this price will have a load of zero. The limit price for a seller si is
cpsi
wsi
.
This example enables us to observe the all or nothing nature of a population of buyers
made up entirely of bargain hunters, and it is here that the limit of Bertrand competition in
its classic sense is reached. In order to elicit more complex resource allocations, we must
turn to other buyer behaviours.
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4.2 Time Savers
Intuitively, a population of time saverswill posses less of the all or nothing nature of bargain
hunters, as each will prefer potentially any seller whose price is acceptable.
Considering the trivial two-node example described above, what outcome do we expect
with a population of time savers? Recalling that we only consider those sellers in SB at
present, we expect the payoff for s1 and s2 to be
Ps1 =
pps1
jSBj (17)
Ps2 =
pps2
jSBj (18)
Here, unlike with bargain hunters, there is no advantage to undercutting the price of
a competing seller, since this will only serve to reduce the payoff. Instead, the dominant
position is to charge the highest possible price, whilst still remaining in SB; the equilibrium
is at ps1 = ps2 = v
p .
Similarly to bargain hunters however, since ps1 = ps2 , then LS  h 12 ; 12 i. Note that due
to the probabilistic nature of the buyers’ decision function, the load will tend towards this as
the probabilities average out.
Indeed, the same is true of more complex cases with heterogeneous costs and prefer-
ence weights. Since each seller’s market share is independent of their price, given a seller’s
membership of SB, any operation on the price will not affect the load at equilibrium.
4.3 Spread Buyers
4.3.1 Simple Case
For a population of spread buyers, as described above, the sellers’ payoff functions for the
simple two-node case are
Ps1 =
jBj
å
j=1
vp   pps1
2vp   (pps1 + pps2)
 pps1 ; (19)
and
Ps2 =
jBj
å
j=1
vp   pps2
2vp   (pps2 + pps1)
 pps2 : (20)
Sellers s1 and s2 will each then attempt to maximise their respective payoff function as
before. The outcome resource allocation occurs when the system is at equilibrium. Figure
1a illustrates the payoff function for s1, when vp = 300 and pps2 = 250.
Clearly, the best response price for s1 is less than pps2 ; in fact in this instance it is 217:71.
However, given this value as pps1 , s2 is then faced with the payoff function illustrated in
figure 1b. Of course, s1 will respond to this new value for pps2 . Its best response is in this case
204:92. By iteratively calculating each seller’s best response, we observe that this particular
system is at equilibrium when pps1 = p
p
s2 = 200.
Clearly at this point the market share, and hence load, of each seller is also equal: LS =
h 12 ; 12 i.
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Fig. 1 (a) Seller s1’s payoff function with one competitor, and (b) s2’s subsequent payoff function from s1’s
best response.
4.3.2 Complex Case
The same methodology may be employed in more complex cases to determine equilibria,
and hence outcome resource allocations. For the three-node system discussed in section
4.1.2, the sellers’ payoff functions are
Ps1 =
jBj
å
j=1
vp   pps1
3vp   (pps1 + pps2 + pps3)
(ws1 p
p
s1   cps1) ; (21)
Ps2 =
jBj
å
j=1
vp   pps2
3vp   (pps1 + pps2 + pps3)
(ws2 p
p
s2   cps2) ; (22)
and
Ps3 =
jBj
å
j=1
vp   pps3
3vp   (pps1 + pps2 + pps3)
(ws3 p
p
s3   cps3) : (23)
Following the above method, we calculate that this system is at equilibrium when pps1 =
pps2 = 221:75 and p
p
s3 = 237:49. At this point, none of the sellers may increase their respec-
tive payoff by unilaterally choosing a different price.
The allocation at these prices, therefore, is our expected outcome allocation. This may
be calculated for each service provider using equation 6:
lsi =
jBj
å
j=1
vp   ppsi
3vp   (pps1 + pps2 + pps3)
: (24)
In the example discussed here, we therefore have an outcome resource allocation of
LS = h0:3575;0:3575;0:2850i.
In other words, given the above valuation and cost parameters, we expect s1 and s2 to
take 35:75% of the load each, and s3 to take 28:5%.
Adding in the fourth seller at this point, we repeat the calculations. In the four-node
example discussed in section 4.1.2, the prices at equilibrium are pps1 = p
p
s2 = 214:53, p
p
s3 =
233:25 and pps4 = 200:73. The outcome resource allocation is therefore
LS = h0:2536;0:2536;0:1981;0:2946i.
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4.4 Achieving Desired Outcome Allocations
We have so far described how to predict an outcome allocation, the allocation at equilibrium,
given an initial configuration of nodes. How then, should the the sellers’ valuation and cost
values be set in order for the system to stabilise at a particular desired outcome?
The method for achieving this is essentially the reverse of the above process. Firstly,
using the desired load vector as a starting point, we calculate the prices at equilibrium which
give rise to the desired loads. Secondly, suitable values for the sellers’ preference weight and
cost parameters are chosen to give rise to equilibrium at the required prices. This method
was originally described in [37], and will now be illustrated through the use of examples.
4.4.1 A Trivial Example
Suppose initially that we wish to achieve an evenly balanced load between two providers, in
the presence of a population of homogeneous spread buyers. Our desired outcome allocation
is LS = h 12 ; 12 i. Recall that these values are normalised by jBj. However, since the population
of buyers is homogeneous, for each seller, si 2 S it must be that
åBj=1 qi j
jBj = qik ;8bk 2 B ; (25)
where qik is the quantity of p bought by buyer bk from seller si. Therefore, for any seller si,
the non-normalised load lsi = 0:5jBj if and only if qi j = 0:5, for all b j 2 B. In the case of
homogeneous buyers, we may therefore calculate the required equilibrium prices as if there
were a single buyer, which for the sake of consistency we call b j.
Now, given the buyer decision function for spread buyers (from equation 2 above), we
know that we require
(vpb j   pps1)
(vpb j   pps1)+(vpb j   pps2)
= 0:5 ; (26)
which simplifies to
pps1 = p
p
s2 : (27)
In other words, an evenly balanced load will be the outcome allocation when both sellers
quote the same price for p at equilibrium. In this trivial case, we have already seen in section
4.3.1 that this equilibrium may be achieved with zero cost values, cpsi , and when ws1 =ws2 =
1.
4.4.2 A More Complex Example
Now let us consider a more complex desired outcome allocation, LS = h 23 ; 13 i. We wish for
s1 to provide twice the load of s2.
Following the same method, for a given homogeneous buyer valuation, vpb j , we may
calculate the required relationship between pps1 and p
p
s2 at equilibrium to achieve our desired
outcome is
(vpb j   pps1)
(vpb j   pps1)+(vpb j   pps2)
=
2
3
; (28)
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which simplifies to
pps2 =
vpb j + p
p
s1
2
: (29)
In order to achieve our desired outcome allocation, the prices pps1 and p
p
s2 must conform
to this relationship at equilibrium.
The question then arises of what preference weight and cost values, ws1 , ws2 , c
p
s1 and c
p
s2 ,
can be chosen in order to satisfy this constraint. In our example, when vpb j = 300 ;8b j 2 B,
we therefore require that
pps2 = 150+
pps1
2
: (30)
An appropriate method may then be used to find suitable parameters to satisfy this rela-
tionship at equilibrium. As is shown in [37], one approach is to fix the cost values cps1 and c
p
s2 ,
say at 1:0, in which case the constraint is satisfied when when ws1 = 1:0 and ws2 = 0:42105.
Therefore, by using the correct cost and weight values, our desired outcome allocation of
LS = h 23 ; 13 i may be achieved. A similar approach may be taken with other buyer decision
functions.
5 Evolutionary Market Agents
We outlined in section 2.5 that the key problem to be addressed by a seller is that of how to
adapt its price over time, such as to maximise its payoff through transactions in the market.
We have also seen how buyers might make decisions about from whom to purchase the
resource. We now turn our attention to the sellers’ pricing agents, proposing the use of
autonomous evolutionary market agents.
The calculation of a best response by a seller, as described in the previous section, makes
two unrealistic assumptions: firstly, that each seller possesses current knowledge of all its
competitors’ prices, and secondly that it knows the decision function of every buyer. The
first assumption may not be a problem in small systems, but in larger systems consisting of
tens of thousands of nodes, this kind of global knowledge may not be available. However,
the absence of knowledge of buyers’ decision functions is a classic assumption in economic
games, especially in the presence of a heterogeneous population.
Without knowledge of the buyers’ decision functions, sellers cannot calculate a best
response price, and must instead take an exploratory approach to finding it. Evolutionary
computation provides an effective method of achieving this, given the black box nature of
the problem. Indeed, a coevolutionary approach has long been used to model competing
players in repeated games such as the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [4]. With the evolutionary
algorithm outlined in this section, sellers expect to find good responses to the market. This
approach allows us to achieve an approximation to the game theoretic outcome above, under
the assumption of private information.
5.1 The Evolutionary Market Agent Algorithm
An evolutionary market agent operates on behalf of a particular service providing node in
order to adaptively price its resource over time. Using evolutionary computation techniques,
the agent evolves the market position of its host over time, in response to current market
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conditions. A population of prices is evolved on-line, with payoff information from the
market being used as fitness values, and the self-interested objective of payoff maximisation
[36]. Competition between sellers is therefore driven by the coevolution of their respective
evolutionary market agents.
As in our previous work [36], in this model a market position consists simply of price.
Therefore each member of the population, an individual in evolutionary computation ter-
minology, represents a real-valued price. For each interaction in the market, an individual’s
price is adopted, and the resulting payoff provides its fitness.
The evolutionary algorithm used for seller si’s agent proceeds as follows:
1. Decide upon the design parameters to be used: initial price range [pmin, pmax], popula-
tion size and mutation factor, a . In the simulations described, pmin = 0, and pmax = 500.
A population size of 20 was used, with a mutation factor, a = 0:1.
2. Generate an initial population, Pop, and set k= 1. Each individual in Pop is a real value,
drawn from the uniform random distribution [pmin, pmax].
3. Initial fitness testing
(a) Set the seller’s offer to the value of the first individual in Pop, and enter the market
for one market time-step. Record the seller’s payoff, Psi as that individual’s fitness.
(b) Repeat for the next individual in Pop, until all initial individuals have been evaluated
in the market.
4. Probabilistic tournament selection
(a) Select four individuals, x1;x2;x3 and x4 from Pop, at random, such that x1 6= x2 6=
x3 6= x4.
(b) Let champion c1 be either x1 or x2, the fitness of whichever is greater with probabil-
ity 0:9, the fitness of whichever is less otherwise.
(c) Let champion c2 be either x3 or x4, the fitness of whichever is greater with probabil-
ity 0:9, the fitness of whichever is less otherwise.
5. Let the offspring, o, be a new individual with its price equal to the mid-point of c1 and
c2.
6. Mutate o, by perturbing its value by a random number drawn from a normal distribution
with mean zero and standard deviation a .
7. Select the individual in fx1;x2;x3;x4g with the lowest fitness value, remove it from Pop,
and insert o into Pop.
8. Set the seller’s offer to the value encoded in o, and enter the market for one market
time-step. Record the seller’s payoff, Psi as o’s fitness.
9. Repeat from step 4.
5.2 Predicted Outcomes with Evolutionary Market Agents
Most fundamentally to note about our evolutionary market agents is that they, as expected,
do not have knowledge of the buyers’ decision functions, and hence do not calculate a best
response to the current state of the market. Their behaviour is instead exploratory and my-
opic. This has important implications for the outcome of their competition in the presence
of bargain hunters and time savers, since these buyer types have a step in their decision
functions.
By contrast, spread buyers have the benefit of giving rise to a seller market share func-
tion, and hence payoff function, which degrades gracefully as a seller moves away from the
optimal price. Our evolutionary market agents lend themselves better to this behaviour. As
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an illustration, consider the scenario when a seller s1 is competing with s2, where vp = 300
and pps2 = 250. Figure 2 illustrates the payoff s1 can expect to receive as a function of its
own next price, pps1 , for the three buyer types we discussed in section 3.3.
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Fig. 2 Seller s1’s payoff function with one competitor, for each of the buyer types.
The step function is clearly visible here, for sellers dealing with either bargain hunters
or time savers. We may expect therefore, that in the absence of full knowledge of the buy-
ers’ decision functions (i.e. the curves shown here), and relying upon a myopic exploratory
heuristic, that a seller will oscillate between receiving a near-optimal payoff, and one of
zero.
Such an oscillation between high and low payoffs is not conducive of stable outcomes.
Indeed, for bargain hunters, the position of the step for a given seller will depend upon its
competitors’ prices. Since the same is also true of the other competitors, the exact equilib-
rium position of the step, given by the sellers’ prices, will be fairly arbitrary.
For spread buyers, however, a small move away from the optimal price leads to a small
change in payoff for the seller. The resulting impact upon the other sellers’ payoff functions
is also minimal. This incremental characteristic of a market of spread buyers leads to a less
brittle, more predictable system.
6 Simulation Results
By using this coevolutionary approach we expect the system to reach an approximation
to the predicted outcome. However, given the evolutionary market agents’ stochastic, ex-
ploratory nature, and the uncertainty introduced by their myopic behaviour, statistical results
gained experimentally are useful.
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We now explore the scenarios described in section 4, and some larger, more complex
examples, in simulation.
6.1 A Baseline Scenario
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of this behaviour over time in a scenario with two service
providing nodes, such that S = fs1;s2g. Both s1 and s2 are represented by an evolutionary
market agent, as described above, each with a population size of 20 and a mutation factor of
0:1. B consists of ten homogeneous spread buyers, such that vp = 300.
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Fig. 3 Evolution of price (above) and load (below) of two service providing nodes over time, with a popula-
tion of 10 spread buyers. Stable even load balancing emerges. Mean and standard deviation over 30 indepen-
dent runs.
Figure 3 clearly shows the ability of our approach to achieve a roughly even load be-
tween the two service providers in a short time. This is due to the evolutionary agents’
competitively coevolving their prices to within close proximity of each other quickly, result-
ing in roughly even shares of the market. Following these exploratory fluctuations, the loads
stabilise as the prices converge to the predicted equilibrium, here 200. At this point, the
loads are highly equal. Due to diverse populations within each agent’s population however,
their prices, and hence the allocation of resources, continue to vary to a small degree.
6.2 Comparing Buyer Types
We now turn our attention to the behaviour of the system in the presence of bargain hunters
and time savers. Intuitively, from section 5.2 above, we expect oscillatory behaviour when
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these buyers’ decision functions, with their step characteristics, are present. When observing
the load on service providing nodes in simulation, this unreliable behaviour, along with
a high standard deviation, is indeed manifested. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this with two
sellers and a population of 10 bargain hunters, and time savers respectively. The behaviour
illustrated above in figure 3, for spread buyers, is clearly more desirable.
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Fig. 4 Evolution of load of two service providing nodes over time, with a population of 10 bargain hunters.
The step in the buyers’ decision function leads to oscillations and unpredictability. Mean and standard devia-
tion over 30 independent runs.
The presence of the step in the decision function for both bargain hunters and time
savers clearly leads to oscillations in the load allocated between the service providing nodes;
the allocations do not remain stable over time. The graceful degradation of the spread buy-
ers’ decision function, however, leads to a highly stable and evenly balanced load.
6.3 Mixed Buyer Populations
As we have shown, one benefit of spread buyers’ behaviour is the graceful degradation of
a seller’s market share as its price moves away from the optimum (or the optimum moves
away as competitors update their prices). This smooth curve allows the sellers’ evolutionary
algorithm to easily find the optimum price. By contrast, as we saw in section 6.2, buyer
behaviours with a step in their decision function lead to more erratic, less stable equilibria.
However, how disruptive is the presence of such buyer behaviour in a population oth-
erwise consisting of spread buyers? The experimental result in figure 6 indicates a graceful
degradation of performance in the presence of an increasing proportion of bargain hunters
in the population.
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Fig. 5 Evolution of load of two service providing nodes over time, with a population of 10 time savers. The
step in the buyers’ decision function has less of an oscillatory effect. Mean and standard deviation over 30
independent runs.
6.4 Scalability
Due to the distributed, decentralised nature of our approach, it scales well. This scalability
leads to the behaviour demonstrated in the above simple scenario also being observed in
much larger scenarios. Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of price and load for 1;000 sellers
and 10;000 buyers in a typical run of the simulation. Figure 8 shows the mean and standard
deviation of the load variance for 30 independent runs. It is clear that in this respect the
approach is highly scalable.
Here results are of a similar form to the smaller simulation. Figure 9 shows the time
taken for the system to reach within 1% of the predicted outcome allocation, from the initial
allocation, as the number of sellers increases.
A further important question concerning the scalability of the approach, and one that
is shared with many other market-based mechanisms such as CATNET [3], is that of how
knowledge of offers is disseminated around the system. In some embodiments of the model,
such as networks making use of wireless technology, broadcasting may indeed be achiev-
able. In peer-to-peer networks, the broadcast facility may be emulated through algorithms
such as flooding [47], distributed hash tables [46] or epidemic algorithms [20]. However, Ar-
daiz et al. [3] argue quite correctly that decentralised and self-interested resource allocation
approaches should prefer decentralised, incentive-compatible discovery mechanisms.
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Fig. 6 The proximity of the outcome resource allocation to the predicted outcome degrades gracefully with
respect to the proportion of bargain hunters in a population otherwise consisting of spread buyers. Each data
point is from 30 independent runs of a simulation with two sellers, each with identical preferences and costs,
and 100 buyers, which vary along the x axis.
6.5 Uneven Resource Allocations
As described in section 4 above, by incorporating a notion of preference and cost into sell-
ers’ payoff functions, we may achieve stable, desired uneven resource allocations. We now
illustrate this in simulation, considering the four-node case described in section 4.1.2, in the
presence of 100 spread buyers. Table 6.5 compares the predicted and experimental outcomes
for this example. The experimental results show the state of the system at iteration 1;000,
for 30 independent runs.
Seller Predicted Price Experimental Price Standard Deviation
s1 214.53 214.79 6.41
s2 214.53 217.68 6.10
s3 233.25 233.26 5.98
s4 200.73 201.62 10.34
Seller Predicted Load Experimental Load Standard Deviation
s1 0.2536 0.2503 0.0161
s2 0.2536 0.2535 0.0156
s3 0.1981 0.1999 0.0133
s4 0.2946 0.2967 0.0220
Table 1 Comparison of predicted and experimental outcome allocations: uneven allocation example. Exper-
imental results calculated over 30 independent runs.
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Fig. 7 Evolution of price and load variance between 1;000 service providing nodes over time, with a popu-
lation of 10;000 spread buyers. Results from a typical run.
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buyers. The approach is clearly highly scalable. Mean and standard deviation over 30 independent runs.
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Fig. 9 Time taken to reach close proximity to the predicted outcome allocation (within 1%). Each data point
represents the mean and standard deviation over 30 independent runs.
Clearly, the coevolutionary approach is able to achieve results very close to the predicted
outcome, with a high degree of reliability. It is however, worth noting that the unusually high
standard deviation of s4 is due to an outlier in the data obtained. Since the data represents
a snapshot of the system at iteration 1;000, and given the continued Gaussian mutation of
prices about the equilibrium, occasional, temporary outliers are to be expected.
6.6 Design of the Evolutionary Algorithm
The evolutionary algorithm used here is not the result of extended experimental tuning or
design, and as such we fully expect that it may be improved upon. We do not at this stage
claim that our evolutionary market agents are superior to other already existing adaptive
pricing algorithms, however, this is not our primary concern at this stage. Rather, we are keen
to emphasise the sufficiency of the coevolutionary approach to drive competition between
sellers and achieve the effects described. A useful extension to this work would be to perform
a comparison with other suitable strategies, such as the Gjerstad-Dickhaut [25] and Roth-
Erev [49] algorithms.
However, during the course of the experimentation, some results concerning the evolu-
tionary algorithm itself were obtained which we now briefly report. Particularly, the decision
to use either stochastic or deterministic selection and replacement operators affects the algo-
rithm’s performance. Two variants of each operator were tested. For selection, the variants
were the stochastic selection method described in section 5 and a more deterministic version
where the winner of each tournament was always chosen to be a parent. For replacement,
the variants were the deterministic operator described in section 5, where the worst indi-
vidual out of those in the tournament was always replaced, and an alternative where with a
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probability of 0:1 the individual replaced was instead selected at random from those in the
tournament. Combining these, the four variants of the algorithm tested were as follows:
– Both deterministic selection and replacement operators,
– Deterministic selection but probabilistic replacement,
– Probabilistic selection and probabilistic replacement, and
– Probabilistic selection but deterministic replacement.
In the experiments, all variants of the algorithm were able to find the equilibrium price,
but differed on their behaviour once at the optimum. Figure 10 shows the standard deviation
of each algorithm’s price about the mean for a seller over 30 independent runs.
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Fig. 10 Probabilistic selection, combined with the deterministic replacement operator enables the algorithm
to remain closer to the equilibrium price.
As can be seen, the use of both deterministic operators led to a high and highly volatile
standard deviation, indicating frequent significant fluctuations in price. The two variants
with probabilistic replacement operators performed very similarly, with lower and signifi-
cantly more stable standard deviations. The lowest standard deviation was achieved by the
variant with the probabilistic selection but deterministic replacement operators. This is the
algorithm described in section 5 and it is for this reason that it was chosen for the majority
of our experiments.
We have yet to carry out a detailed analysis of the reasons for this behaviour, however in-
tuitively we expected the probabilistic operators would improve performance. This is since,
in the early part of the simulation, a price higher than the equilibrium might yield a high
payoff for a seller, but once the other competitors had responded to this, it would no longer
be possible for any seller to reach such a high payoff. This price would remain in the popula-
tion, and frequently win tournaments, despite its adoption at a later iteration being unlikely
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to reproduce the high payoff. The market would have moved on and its fitness would be out
of date. Probabilistic selection ensures that other individuals, with lower fitnesses but per-
haps more suited to the current market conditions, can get selected instead. It is interesting
then that probabilistic replacement did not bring about a similar performance gain. However,
though it might be useful to occasionally select individuals with only an average fitness in
future iterations, it is likely that individuals with very low fitness would perform poorly in
any scenario, and there would therefore be little to gain by retaining them. A more formal
analysis of the populations over time will prove illuminating.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
We have described a resource allocation problem, motivated by an emerging computational
paradigm: dynamic, decentralised, service-based systems. Making use of the retail-inspired
posted-offer market model, we proposed a fully decentralised, evolutionary market-based
solution, which uses competitive coevolution between self-interested sellers to achieve a
desired resource allocation. We illustrated this by using the approach to achieve a balanced
load, and a number of other stable outcome allocations.
We have analysed the predicted equilibria in the system, and hence demonstrated a
methodology for, given an initial configuration, determining the outcome resource alloca-
tion in the presence of various buyer behaviours. We applied this methodology in order to
validate both previous [36,37] and new simulation results.
Furthermore, we explored the relationship between experimental performance, in simu-
lation, and such predictions for three buyer behaviour models. We concluded that behaviours
with a step in their decision function lead to unstable, erratic outcome allocations. Those
with smooth decision functions however, such as spread buyers, lead to highly accurate and
stable allocations, as well as being robust to small changes in price. We further showed that
this performance degrades gracefully as the proportion of buyers with step functions in the
population increases.
Crucially, our approach assumes not only a lack of cooperation between agents but also
self-interest. We believe that it is more suited to this scenario than other decentralised ap-
proaches, since it accounts for such self-interested utility maximising behaviour. Unlike
many market-based systems, our approach requires no central or regional point of control
or coordination, such as an auctioneer or specialist. Only private information is available
to the agents, as sellers have no knowledge of the size of the marketplace, the number of
competitors or any history. Our approach is highly scalable. We showed that the time taken
for the system to converge to close proximity of the predicted outcome allocation appears to
grow asymptotically to the number of service providing nodes. Additionally, the system has
no point which is weaker than any other, and is hence robust to failure.
7.2 Future Work
The future directions identified for this work fall into a number of distinct areas. Firstly,
we aim to consider higher level strategies for both buyers and sellers, for example those
able to make use of historical information, as well as others found in the literature such as
the Gjerstad-Dickhaut [25] and Roth-Erev [49] algorithms. The outcomes from this will be
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compared with existing results. Crucially, the strategies presented here act as price-takers,
despite the effect they have on the market. Higher level strategies may be able to exploit
this. As discussed in section 3.3.4, sticky buyers, who prefer to continue using service
providers which they have previously used unless there is significant reason to switch, pro-
vide a model of potentially highly realistic behaviour. Furthermore, the degree of stickiness
may be parametrised, creating space of buyer strategies to be explored.
Secondly, it is highly likely that more realistic scenarios will be dynamic, where service
providers may be added to or removed from the system during its operation. In addition, the
population of buyers may change over time, and there may also be external disturbances. It
will be desirable for the system to automatically adjust to such changes, and also for us to be
able to predict how quickly this is achieved. A future, more realistic model should include
further issues with which to describe the service, such as a measure of quality of service.
Sellers could then achieve product differentiation, able to attract buyers with different pro-
files. Outcomes in this case are likely to be more complex than in the model investigated
here. A further consideration in a more realistic model might be a potential performance hit
as a result of breaking a task up into several sub-tasks, as is done here. If this were to be the
case, then this should be quantified and its effect built into the model.
Finally, more advanced tuning of the evolutionary algorithm used in the sellers’ evolu-
tionary market agents should improve system performance, and analysis of the algorithm’s
properties, especially in dynamic environments, will be useful in achieving this. An adaptive
mutation factor, in order to allow sellers to explore the market widely when necessary, but
to compete without reckless price changes, may be a useful starting point.
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